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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000200110011-2

3 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: More Vietnam Numbers Problems

1. In light of the impending USIB consideration of NIE 14.3-67, you should be aware of the attached exchange of traffic which bears on both the estimate's and the U.S. Government's present handling of the problem of counting and classifying Viet Cong guerrillas and other paramilitary or "militia" forces.

2. The estimate draft distinguishes the guerrillas from the others (self defense, secret self defense, assault youth, etc.). The draft contains the judgment, agreed in Saigon, that the number of guerrillas is now probably in the 70,000 - 90,000 range. It gives no quantified guess regarding the current number of other irregular elements, a point also agreed in Saigon.

3. We on the American side, particularly COMUSMACV, have always drawn a sharper distinction between the guerrillas and the other paramilitary elements than is drawn by the Communists. Evidence has recently come to light which suggests the VC may be further blurring this distinction to the point where our rather arbitrary U.S. breakout may be more misleading than helpful. We will need to do a lot more concentrated research in this area and the results of this research will probably require a recasting of the 14.3 figures and definitions regarding guerrillas and other local VC elements.

4. I am not suggesting that the estimate should be withheld nor am I advocating that the bidding should once again be reopened

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on its paragraphs which relate to this very sticky and complex problem. You should be aware, however, of the potential import of recently acquired evidence and of the Station's views on this matter, which are expressed in paragraph six of the attached Saigon cable.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

cc: DDCI
D/ONE
ONE - Mr. Hyland
DDI
D/OCI
OCI -
OER -
C/FE
C/YNO

O/DCI/SAVA:VAS:GACarver:taw:3Nov67

Distribution:

As above w/2 atts

1 - VAS Chrono w/atts

1 - GAC Chrono w/atts ✓

1 - SAA w/atts

1-14.3-67 New OB ✓

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO

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DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 47164

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1. SENDING INTERIM REPLY AS WILL TAKE SEVERAL DAYS TO
GET RETURNS FROM FIELD. SO FAR NO INFORMATION OF "CONSOLIDATED
MILITIA/ GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION" OTHER THAN IV CORPS ☐ REPORTS,
SPECIFICALLY ☐ FROM CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE. OB NUMBERS
PROBLEM MORE COMPLEX EVEN THAN REFERENCE SUGGESTS.

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2. ☐ SPEAK OF CONSOLIDATING HAMLET
AND VILLAGE GUERRILLAS BUT DO NOT MENTION MILITIA. ☐
MENTIONS "PART-TIME" GUERRILLAS. A NUMBER OF REPORTS TELL
OF BREAKING GUERRILLA UNITS INTO SAPPER GROUPS AND GIVING
THEM SPECIAL TRAINING.

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3. REVIEW OF SEPTEMBER PROVINCE REPORTS AND RECENT
DOCUMENTS (E.G. ☐

INDICATE GUERRILLA PROGRAM-- BOTH PLANS AND ORGANIZATION--
IN STATE OF FLUX THROUGHOUT COUNTRY AND APPARENTLY MOVING
DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS IN DIFFERENT PROVINCES. VILLAGE

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PAGE TWO SAIGON S E C R E T

COMMITTEES BEING GIVEN CONTRADICTIONARY ORDERS TO ENCOURAGE MORE GUERRILLAS TO MOVE UP TO MAIN FORCES AND TO STRENGTHEN GUERRILLA UNITS.

4. WE ARE PROBABLY KIDDING OURSELVES IF WE THINK IN TERMS OF TWO RATHER UNIFORM AND DISPARATE CLASSES OF IRREGULARS-- GUERRILLAS AND MILITIA. THE IRREGULAR STRUCTURE APPEARS TO HAVE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF ORGANIZATIONS AND TO VARY FROM REGION TO REGION, PERHAPS FROM PROVINCE TO PROVINCE. IT IS A ROUGHLY PYRAMIDAL STRUCTURE THE BASE OF WHICH DISOLVES INTO THE MASS OF THE PEOPLE UNDER VIET CONG CONTROL IN A MANNER THAT MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW A SHARP LINE AND SAY THAT THOSE ON ONE SIDE ARE IRREGULARS AND THE OTHERS ARE NOT. SIMILARLY, THOUGH PERHAPS TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE EXISTENCE OF "PART-TIME GUERRILLAS" AND, POSSIBLE, FULL-TIME MILITIA MAKES THE LINE BETWEEN THESE CATEGORIES A VERY FUZZY ONE.

5. THE ATTEMPT TO ENUMERATE THE IRREGULARS WITHIN PRECISE CATEGORIES IS A SISYPHEAN TASK. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE OVERLAPS OR OMISSIONS. THIS SEEMS FAR LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE FACT THAT MACV J-2 IS STILL OFFICIALLY CARRYING THE RIDICULOUS FIGURE OF 112,760 IRREGULARS, UNCHANGED FOR

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OVER A YEAR AND A HALF. AND, IF THEY CHANGE FROM THIS TO THE FIGURE THAT WAS AGREED AT THE CONFERENCE HERE, 70,000 TO 90,000 GUERRILLAS, ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE A GREAT IMPROVEMENT, THE SPREAD IS TOO NARROW AND PROBABLY SHOULD BE RAISED CONSIDERABLY ON THE UPPER SIDE.

6. I WOULD URGE THAT INSTEAD OF STRUGGLING WITH MACV OVER WHETHER THE LINE BETWEEN GUERRILLAS AND MILITIA HAS BEEN FURTHER FUZZED AND FURTHER INACCURACY ADDED TO ALREADY DUBIOUS GUERRILLA OB FIGURES, WE OUGHT TO STRIVE TO ACHIEVE A WHOLE NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF QUANTIFYING VIET CONG IRREGULAR STRENGTH. I SUGGEST THAT COMMUNIST "PEOPLES FORCES" SHOULD BE THOUGHT OF MORE IN TERMS OF EXPLOITATION OF POPULATION RESOURCES RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF CLASSICAL MILITARY OB. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PROBLEM HANDLED IN TERMS SOMEWHAT LIKE THE PARAGRAPH WHICH FOLLOWS.

7. THE VIET CONG HAVE ACCESS TO BETWEEN 2.5 MILLION AND 3 MILLION PEOPLE IN THE TERRITORY THEY CONTROL PLUS SOME IN DISPUTED AND GVN-HELD TERRITORY. THEY CONSIDER ALL OF THEM RESOURCES TO BE USED IN WAR. A LARGE PART OF THEM ARE DIRECTLY EMPLOYED ON A SPORADIC, PART-TIME, OR FULL-TIME BASIS

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PAGE FOUR SAIGON S E C R E T

IN MILITARY AND QUASI-MILITARY ACTIVITIES. PERHAPS AS MANY AS 100,000 ARE SERVING AS FULL-TIME GUERRILLAS AND AT ANY GIVEN TIME THERE MAY BE 100,000 OR MORE OF THE OTHERS STANDING GUARD. BUILDING FORTIFICATIONS, REMOVING WOUNDED AND DEAD, PERFORMING LOGISTIC SERVICES OR OTHERWISE PARTICIPATING IN THE VC WAR EFFORT. WHAT THEY DO FOR THE VIET CONG IS LARGELY DONE BY UNIFORMED FULL-TIME TROOPS IN ALLIED FORCES, WHICH MAKES COMPARISON OF NUMBERS MISLEADING.

8. WILL REPLY BY CABLE AS SOON AS ANSWERS ARE RECEIVED FROM OUR IV CORPS REGIONAL OFFICE AND MACV OB.

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CITE DIRECTOR

SAIGON

REFS: A. SAIGON

B. SAIGON 3341 (IN 72294)

FOR

1. SEPTEMBER VC ACTIVITIES REPORT OF CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE (PARA 1, REF A) INDICATES THAT ~~ONE~~ DISTRICT-LEVEL DEFECTOR STATED THAT A COSVN DIRECTIVE OF JULY 1967 "DID AWAY" WITH VC HAMLET AND VILLAGE GUERRILLAS, AND "CONSOLIDATED A MILITIA/GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION." REPORTED ORGANIZATION APPEARS TO COMBINE GUERRILLAS AND SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA. REF A FURTHER STATES THAT "MEMBER OF VC TRA VINH PROVINCE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE . . . VERIFIED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIA/GUERRILLA UNITS." VC ACTIVITIES SEPTEMBER REPORT OF IV CORPS (REF B, PARA 2), COMMENTED THAT "VC APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR LOW-LEVEL UNITS."

2. BECAUSE OF IMMINENT DROPPING FROM MACV OB OF VC SELF-DEFENSE ELEMENTS (ONE OF THE TWO APPARENT COMPONENTS OF CONSOLI-

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Synopsis

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PAGE TWO

B. INFORM CHIEF OF MACV OB BRANCH OF THE POTENTIAL ACCOUNTING PROBLEM (WHICH HE MAY WELL BE AWARE OF).

COORDINATING OFFICES

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C. CABLE REPLY AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE,
GIVING RUNDOWN OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, OR LACK OF
IT, ON "MILITIA/GUERRILLA UNITS," MACV J-2 COMMENTS,
AND YOUR OWN OBSERVATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

4. FYI. REPORT OF POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATION
IS TOUCHED ON IN LATEST DRAFT ~~14~~ NIE 14.3,
BUT NO CHANGES ARE PLANNED IN NIE STRENGTH
FIGURES.

D/OCIV

D/ONE

D/OER

C/VNC

William E. Colby, C/FE

George A. Carver
SAVA

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